A New Ethical Theory Or A New Contribution To Current Ethical Theory? Zagzebski’s Theory Of ‘Moral Exemplar’

Gönül Emirbilek

Article Details

A New Ethical Theory Or A New Contribution To Current Ethical Theory? Zagzebski’s Theory Of ‘Moral Exemplar’

Authors:

Gönül Emirbilek

Publisher:

Mersin University

Main Topics:

20. Yüzyıl Felsefesi | Kıta Felsefesi

Journal:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.67-85

Document Type:

Article

Publication Date:

10/2024

Document Language:

Turkish

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330319

pISSN:

2148-9327

Keywords:

Abstract:

 This study examines Linda Zagzebskis moral exemplar theory, which is based on exemplars of moral goodness and presented as a new ethical theory alternative to deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. Zagzebski attempts to provide all the conceptual and theoretical background for presentation of this theory as a new theory. This theory, which purports to be a plausible proposal for our ethical understanding, is presented by Zagzebski supported by a theory of the theory and a theory of direct reference from Putnam and Kripke. Rather than presenting particular virtues as character traits, his theory expresses a new view of morality grounded in direct reference to particular moral exemplars themselves, which are considered paradigmatically good. Zazgsebskis theory does not offer an explanation of concepts such as virtue, right action, duty, a good end, etc., which seem essential for a moral theory. Instead, it represents an unorthodox attempt to justify all the concepts and types of actions that need to be explained morally by attributing them directly to the moral exemplars themselves. This article argues that, despite Zagzebskis attempts, it is not a new theory, questioning the reliability of the basis that makes moral exemplars as examples of moral goodness, and concluding that this theory can be meaningful and useful if it is integrated into virtue ethics as a complementary part.

 This study examines Linda Zagzebskis moral exemplar theory, which is based on exemplars of moral goodness and presented as a new ethical theory alternative to deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. Zagzebski attempts to provide all the conceptual and theoretical background for presentation of this theory as a new theory. This theory, which purports to be a plausible proposal for our ethical understanding, is presented by Zagzebski supported by a theory of the theory and a theory of direct reference from Putnam and Kripke. Rather than presenting particular virtues as character traits, his theory expresses a new view of morality grounded in direct reference to particular moral exemplars themselves, which are considered paradigmatically good. Zazgsebskis theory does not offer an explanation of concepts such as virtue, right action, duty, a good end, etc., which seem essential for a moral theory. Instead, it represents an unorthodox attempt to justify all the concepts and types of actions that need to be explained morally by attributing them directly to the moral exemplars themselves. This article argues that, despite Zagzebskis attempts, it is not a new theory, questioning the reliability of the basis that makes moral exemplars as examples of moral goodness, and concluding that this theory can be meaningful and useful if it is integrated into virtue ethics as a complementary part.

 This study examines Linda Zagzebskis moral exemplar theory, which is based on exemplars of moral goodness and presented as a new ethical theory alternative to deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. Zagzebski attempts to provide all the conceptual and theoretical background for presentation of this theory as a new theory. This theory, which purports to be a plausible proposal for our ethical understanding, is presented by Zagzebski supported by a theory of the theory and a theory of direct reference from Putnam and Kripke. Rather than presenting particular virtues as character traits, his theory expresses a new view of morality grounded in direct reference to particular moral exemplars themselves, which are considered paradigmatically good. Zazgsebskis theory does not offer an explanation of concepts such as virtue, right action, duty, a good end, etc., which seem essential for a moral theory. Instead, it represents an unorthodox attempt to justify all the concepts and types of actions that need to be explained morally by attributing them directly to the moral exemplars themselves. This article argues that, despite Zagzebskis attempts, it is not a new theory, questioning the reliability of the basis that makes moral exemplars as examples of moral goodness, and concluding that this theory can be meaningful and useful if it is integrated into virtue ethics as a complementary part.

 Bu çalışma Linda Zagzebskinin ahlaki iyilik timsallerine dayandırdığı ve deontolojik, sonuççu ve erdem etiğine alternatif yeni bir etik teori olarak sunduğu ahlak timsali kuramını mercek altına almaktadır. Zagzebskinin bu kuramın yeni bir teori olarak sunulması için gerekli görülen tüm kavramsal ve teorik arka planı sunmaya çalıştığı görülür. Etik kavrayışımız açısından makul bir teklif olma iddiasını taşıyan bu kuram, Zagzebski tarafından teorinin teorisi ve Putnam ve Kripkeden aldığı doğrudan referans teorisi ile desteklenerek sunulmaktadır. Onun kuramı, belirli erdemleri birer karakter özelliği olarak sunmaktan ziyade, doğrudan paradigmatik olarak iyi kabul edilen belirli ahlak timsallerinin kendilerine referansla temellendirilen yeni bir ahlaki bakışı ifade etmektedir. Zazgsebskinin kuramı, bir ahlak teorisi için açıklanması elzem görünen erdem, doğru eylem, ödev, iyi bir amaç vb. kavramların birer açıklamasını sunmaz. Onun yerine ahlaki olarak açıklanmasına ihtiyaç duyulan tüm kavram ve eylem türlerini ahlak timsallerinin doğrudan kendilerine atfederek gerekçelendirme yoluna giden alışılmışın dışında bir girişimi ifade etmektedir. Bu makalede, Zagzebskinin tüm çabasına rağmen söz konusu kuramın yeni bir teori olmadığı iddia edilmekte, ahlak timsallerini iyi bir ahlak örneği yapan temelin güvenilirliği sorgulanmakta ve bu kuramın tamamlayıcı bir parça olarak erdem etiğine entegre edilmesi durumunda anlamlı ve faydalı olabileceği savunulmaktadır.

Article Details

A New Ethical Theory Or A New Contribution To Current Ethical Theory? Zagzebski’s Theory Of ‘Moral Exemplar’

Authors:

Gönül Emirbilek

Publisher:

Mersin University

Main Topics:

20. Yüzyıl Felsefesi | Kıta Felsefesi

Journal:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.67-85

Document Type:

Article

Publication Date:

10/2024

Document Language:

Turkish

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330319

pISSN:

2148-9327

ethics

virtue

morality

moral exemplar

goodnessetik

erdem

ahlak

ahlak timsali

iyilik

Issues

Article Details

Authors: Gönül Emirbilek

Publisher: Mersin University

Main Topics: 20. Yüzyıl Felsefesi | Kıta Felsefesi

Journal: Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.67-85

Document Type: Article

Publication Date: 10/2024

Document Language: Turkish

Document ID (Org No.): 2001330319

pISSN: 2148-9327

Issues

Authors:

Gönül Emirbilek

Publisher:

Mersin University

Main Topics:

20. Yüzyıl Felsefesi | Kıta Felsefesi

Journal:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.67-85

Document Type:

Article

Publication Date:

10/2024

Document Language:

Turkish

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330319

pISSN:

2148-9327